Plainfield Asset Mgt Investors Insulted by Ex- Hedgie Executive’s Cheap Cash Offer

A former top dog portfolio manager at hedge fund Plainfield Asset Management, Marc Sole, is using the funds of his new hedge fund to try and buy out remaining investors in the now defunct Plainfield for a discount. According to offer documents seen by this reporter Sole, who now works for $4 billion Hudson Bay Capital, offered investors in four liquidating Plainfield funds 52 cents on the dollar. The problem is investors say they never received a transparent valuation from Plainfield, or the liquidator PwC Cayman, of the remaining amount of their interest in the funds.

Plainfield made international headline news in 2008 for gating their $5 billion hedge fund and locking investors from cashing out. The fund founded by Max Holmes, who now teaches at NYU’s Stern school of business, was investigated by the SEC for inflating investors assets to receive excessive fees. The SEC cleared the fund of its investigation in June 2012, according to a letter from the SEC, but Holmes was extremely slow in winding down the fund. Plainfield 2008 Liquidating Ltd. and Plainfield 2009 Liquidating Ltd. were put into voluntary liquidation in the Cayman Islands on December 31st 2013 according to public filings at gazettes.gov.ky According to investors, the portion of assets in these funds is only a sub/residual piece of what Plainfield had originally invested in.

Plainfield was also investigated by the Manhattan D.A. for its loan to own practices with small cap companies but was never charged by the D.A. for wrong doing.

Sole started with Hudson Bay in 2011, he was one of Max Holmes right hand guys helping pick investments for the failed fund. The Hudson Bay Absolute Return Credit Opportunities Fund made the offer to Plainfield investors, who are mostly institutional money, on December 16th 2014. Investors were given only 30 days to decide if they want to take the deal. Ian Stokoe and David Walker are running the Plainfield liquidation at PwC Cayman.

Sole chose to enlist the help of Plainfield’s former General Counsel Thomas X. Fritsch who is now an attorney for white-shoe Wall St. law firm Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP. Fritsch is known for his dirty tactics defending Plainfield after the media was questioning the ethics of the hedge fund leadership. In 2011 I published a story showing Max Holmes caught on camera encouraging his staff how to avoid possibly incriminating emails by cc’ing Fritsch on the communication to claim attorney client privilege.

Unlike investors, Sole and Fritsch who worked as senior executives at Plainfield through its hype and downfall should have some sense of what assets are being liquidating and judge what value they could fetch on the open market.

One institutional investor who received the Hudson Bay offer told this reporter in an email, “Needless to say as an LP I find this offer in extremely poor taste and offensive. Are Sole and Fritsch that desperate to make a buck that the only way they can do it is to use inside info to screw over LPs? Shameful.”

Fritsch and Sole did not return a request for comment at press time.
The same Plainfield investor said, “We don’t have any visibility/transparency from Plainfield to ascertain current value. Our firm wrote off significant amounts in prior years. This is a stub/residual piece. We didn’t even dignify the offer [from Hudson Bay] with a response.”

It’s unclear how many Plainfield investors took the Hudson Bay offer which expired on January 15th 2015.

Plainfield’s website says, “At the end of May 2012, Plainfield substantially completed the liquidation of the funds which it managed and deregistered, in good standing, from the S.E.C.” Legal filings in the Cayman’s obviously show there is more liquidation to be done. Why Marc Sole is now offering investors some discounted cash for the fund’s remaining investments is unclear.

Hudson Bay Offer Docs Plainfield 2008 Lidquidating LTD by Teri Buhl

The Seedy World of Microcap Stock Advisors

UPDATE March 6th 2015: AJ Discala’s trading partner at OmniView Capital has thrown in the towel. Marc E. Wexler who was charged on multiple counts of securities fraud plead guilty to two felony charges on October 15th and agreed to pay a forfeiture bond of $1.4 million. Wexler who lives in Colts Neck New Jersey plead to conspiracy to commit securities fraud and securities fraud in the stock CodeSmart ($ITEN). The DOJ’s original complaint said they believed Wexler had made $2.2 million in manipulative trading of CodeSmart. Sentencing appears to be held in Wexler’s case as it is possible he is turned government witness against his partner AJ Discala. Discala switched criminal lawyers a few months ago hiring New York-based Charles A. Ross. AJ and his fellow co-defendants are still slugging through motions for discovery and fighting the DOJ charges. Ex-SEC enforcement attorney Tom Sporkin who ran the microcap fraud unit is also helping Discala on the case. Sporkin is now a white-collar defense lawyer for Buckley Sandler in Washington D.C. The SEC parallel case was stayed in mid-November, which is typical when the DOJ leads on criminal charges. If convicted Discala faces years in prison. AJ told this reporter he will fight the case to trial.

Original Article Sep 18,2014
The CEO of a merchant bank that helped fund dozens of micro-cap companies claims he is a target of regulatory overreach after he was indicted in late July on ten counts of criminal misconduct for his alleged role in pump and dump stock schemes. Abraxas J. Discala (known as A.J.), CEO of Connecticut-based OmniView Capital Advisors, was arrested while on business in Las Vegas in July after the Justice Department revealed what appeared to the DOJ to be damaging wiretaps labeling him as a ringleader who tried to manipulate the price of penny stocks and mislead investors about financials in public companies. The DOJ used Discala’s status as the ex-husband of an actress to get their arrest splashed across international headlines in a move to show Obama’s task force on financial fraud is finally arresting Wall Streeters. But a look inside the deal documents show the Justice Department doesn’t know who the bad actors really are in this case. This reporter was given exclusive access to deal contracts, executive’s emails, and conducted interviews with some of the players involved in one of the alleged stock frauds called CodeSmart ($ITEN). The case shows a unique look at the backroom deals made to help small entrepreneurial companies raise capital through alternate public offerings and highlights the questionable tactics microcap advisors use to get discounted free trading stock.

Discala, age 43, started his career with a Chicago-based firm, TJM Institutional Services, selling bonds after he decided not to go into the family real estate business. He married Sopranos actress Jamie Lynn-Sigler for three years in the early 2000’s taking a break from the Wall Street business and acted in part as the actress’s manager. He returned to high-finance and focused on helping growth companies raise capital. Omniview, his firm, typically made bridge loan investments in microcap companies and consulted with company CEO’s on how to build growth pre-IPO. Discala and his partner Marc Wexler were not registered as placement finders and did not take a cash fee for their advisory services. Instead they would get deep-discounted restricted or unrestricted stock before a company was brought to the public markets as payment for their services. This stock was placed in multiple accounts and the SEC accused Discala of masking who actually had control of the shares so he could avoid reporting owning more than 5 percent of Codesmart’s stock.

AJ would bill himself as a long-term investor when pitching CEO’s and have all parties involved sign lock-up/leak-out agreements, prepared by his counsel, controlling how much of his stock he could sell into the market at a given time. Discala says his goal was to ensure that no one could dump the stock and hurt the currency of the company. He also would hire third-party due diligence subject matter experts to fill any management gaps. “I go in as a long-term investor with members of my team who are very active at trying to add value to a company pre-ipo,” Discala told this reporter.

Discala was arrested after the DOJ started listening in on his daily conversations and learned AJ was working with others to try and move the price of microcap stocks higher. Government wiretaps, obtained for 60 days, started with the Southern District of New York after a whistleblower told them to look into AJ Discala but the case was quickly kicked over to the DOJ’s B-team in the Eastern District of New York, which is run by Loretta Lynch. Lynch’s office is best known for their failure to convict the Bear Stearns hedge fund managers during the financial crisis. Only one of the seven people arrested in Discala’s case live in the E-DOJ’s jurisdiction and none of the stocks in the complaint are domiciled in Lynch’s jurisdiction. Emails show associates of Discala believe a man named Danny Weinstein has talked to the feds about players in the microcap space after a group of eastern Europeans were arrested in April for stock manipulation. Weinstein is believed to have turned confidential informant in the case of US v. Alexander Goldshmidt after a group of investors threatened his life when they lost money in a stock deal; he is also believed to be an unnamed co-conspirator in the case.

The government secured a court order to wiretap Discala after they made the arrest involving the Weinstein/Goldshmidt crew. The tapes give the appearance of Discala and Wexler planning stock purchases at specific prices between each other and using two stockbrokers, who worked for small time brokerage firms, to get their mom and pop clients to buy the stock and create a market. Discala met one of the brokers, Matthew Bell, after consulting for a different company where he learned a large portion of the investors in the company stock were clients of Bell’s. His goal was to find a stockbroker that believed in the small cap stocks he was investing in and was willing to pitch the often risky investments to his main street clients. Discala saw Bell as a more efficient way to get market traction on a microcap stocks than hiring a stock promoter. The problem is the DOJ’s complaint accuses both stockbrokers Discala worked with, Bell and Craig Josephberg, of not telling clients they also received discounted unrestricted stock. The stockbrokers would’ve had to clear the gifted the stock through their compliance office because it would be considered receiving outside compensation from one (Discala) of their clients.

The SEC complaint says, “Both Bell and Josephberg received 125,000 (which later split 2 to 1) unrestricted shares for pennies for investing their clients into CodeSmart stock. Both failed to disclose to their clients their financial incentive to purchase CodeSmart shares for them.”

The DOJ and the Securities and Exchange Commission both brought parallel cases against Discala and crew. Seven people including one lawyer and the CodeSmart CEO were arrested with Discala. But it appears there should have been more arrest.

It is not illegal for companies to give stock to brokers but brokers do have to disclose their ownership of such stock to their clients if they are recommending a buy or sell on the stock. The government complaints do not name the firms the brokers worked for but this reporter learned neither of the brokers were still working for the firms at the time of their arrest. Josephberg was working at Halycon Cabot Partners at the time of the alleged crimes.

Discala, Wexler, Bell, and the other broker ,Craig Josephberg, are accused of selling their gifted stock at the height of the stocks’ trading price for millions in profit. But the DOJ, and parallel SEC complaint, offer no time specific details on when these sell orders went through for profits at the direction of the arrested OmniView executives.

CodeSmart is a company that trained computer programs for medical coding that is about to be required because of ObamaCare legislation. The company founder, Ira Shapiro, who also faces criminal charges, sought the help of Jeffery Howard Auerbach, a registered broker, to get introductions to bankers to help him raise capital. FINRA’s brokercheck shows Auerbach is being sued for $2 million by a client claiming negligence and multiple FINRA securities violations. Auerbach worked for New York-based Kuhns Brothers Securities when he brought the CodeSmart deal to AJ Discala. Emails from April 2013 that Auerbach sent show independent investment professionals: Danny Weinstein, Joe Salvani, Neil Rock, and Seth Fireman were going to act as ‘advisors’ to help Shapiro with the CodeSmart capital raise. When they backed out Discala agreed to raise funds for the bridge loan of $250,000. This money was needed to boost the company balance sheet before a public shell could be bought and a reverse merger completed. Small companies often use reverse mergers to go public because of the significant cost savings.

Deal documents created by Discala’s attorney, Darren Ofsink, show Wexler got 750,000 converted shares for his $150,000 part of the bridge loan investment and a company called ECPC got 500,000 shares for their $100,000 investment. One of the investors in ECPC is a man named Rusty Allen.

After the bridgeloan, Discala quickly worked with attorney Darren Ofsink to find an S-I registered shell to reverse merge CodeSmart into and take the company public. Omniview’s outside counsel Darren Ofsink recommended buying the shell of a Florida based company started by Sheldon Rose, according to emails from Ofsink. The attorney told Discala that Sheldon Rose “was the most meticulous shell guy he’d ever worked with”. When buying a shell you have to make sure enough time has passed so a legal opinion would approve some of the shell’s restricted shares become unrestricted and can trade on open markets as soon a reverse merger is complete; or you face SEC violations if you don’t get the timing right. OmniView pulled together more investors and for $350,000 bought a public shell called First Independence. The reverse merger was complete on May 21st, 2013 according to SEC filings.

The only person to stay in the deal from the original capital raise group was an independent stock marketer Joe Salvani; who had been charged by the SEC during the dot.com boom for selling securities to investors in mainstreetipo.com without being a registered broker. New York State business registration records shows he owns or is affiliated with JFS Investments, Hudson Park Capital, and Draper Inc. All his LLC companies latter received free trading shares in CodeSmart, according to contracts and emails from company executives seen by this reporter. In the late 90’s Forbes published a feature story on Salvani called the ‘Master Tout’. Detailing how he gets discount stock in microcap companies to help market the stock to mainstreet investors and find access to capital. The article alluded to his uncanny ability to spread out his gifted stock into the markets as the price raises and sell these stocks before they crashed.

Salvani told this reporter who saw him entertaining at a hot Wall Street hang out, called STK, in August that he works with a registered broker- named Dan Walsh who currently works in the capital markets group of Garden State Securities (a broker/dealer). Salvani will tell company CEO’s he can help create an active market in their stock and get financing through Garden State Securities even though he doesn’t work for the broker dealer. Dan Walsh, when asked by this reporter, if he works on advisory deals with Salvani did not respond for comment.

Walsh’s bio touts his work as primarily helping micro-cap companies raise capital through PIPE deals and that he is an equities trader. Garden State Securities has nineteen regulatory enforcement actions against the firm and is currently being sued for deceptive marketing practices in stocks they sold retail customers and other securities violations, according to FINRA. An email on May 14th, 2013 from Codesmart’s CEO Shapiro to Discala says, “Salvani and Walsh were asking the company for $6 million shares (which would have been 10% of the company’s outstanding shares at the time) and they wanted the restricted shares to vest as soon as their ‘consulting’ contracts were executed”. Meaning they wanted to get paid in deep discounted stock they could trade right away for a profit. This reporter saw Salvani sign a contract for 2.5 million CodeSmart shares that vested right away but no final contract was seen signed by Dan Walsh personally. Instead, contracts seen by this reporter, show Garden State Securities received 313,332 (post 2:1 split) shares in CodeSmart on June 6th 2013 that become unrestricted in January 2014 for financial advisory services. These shares were granted shortly after the reverse merger was completed when the stock was trading above $6.

By June 28th, 2013, within six weeks of the reverse merger, CodeSmart had run up to $6.90. At the time of the reverse merger on May 21st, 2013 the stock was trading around $2.30. The government’s complaint alleged Wexler and Discala flooded the market with shares via the stockbroker’s clients in May but fails to mention Joe Salvani also had 2.5 million unrestricted shares and a history of moving shares throughout his network of brokers. Wexler and Discala had signed lockup agreements to not offload more than 5% of the shares they held at a time. Discala also held unrestricted shares in a company he controlled called Fidelis and so did stockbroker Josephberg in an LLC called Garper, according to the government complaint. It’s unclear if the stockbrokers had signed lockup agreements in their personal accounts. Salvani was not arrested or charged by the SEC in the CodeSmart case.

The SEC claims in court documents the First Independence shell became effective August 2012 and applied for distribution of 3 million shares to its original 24 investors in January 2013. Sheldon Rose was able to gather all the shares and sell them to investors Discala found in May 2013. The SEC is claiming in litigation the timing of the subsequent required forms for a reverse merger, including a Form 10, was not done timely to allow the 3 million shares to become unrestricted for the CodeSmart investors. A legal opinion letter written by Diane Harrison of Florida-based Harrison Law P.A. on May 21st, 2013 was given to the original CodeSmart investors by Darren Ofsink’s office telling them that on advice of counsel the shares were now free to trade. The Harrison letter stated First Independence (the issuer) registration statement was declared effective by the SEC on March 6th 2012. The letter was also sent to IslandStock Transfer, a clearing firm, stating as of May 21st the issuer had met the reporting requirements of Section 13 of the exchange act and had filed quarterly reports for over one year. The DOJ’s complaint does not argue that the shares were restricted. When shares become unrestricted in a public shell there are multiple firms that have to approve the shares to trade which included broker dealers and clearing firms. None of the firms involved in selling the CodeSmart shares found the shares to be restricted.

According to emails from Ofsink’s office these investors received free trading shares of the reverse merger for funding the purchase of the shell: Fidelis Holding (owned by Discala) 312,500 shares, Jeffrey Auerbach 150,000 , Marlene Goepel (Discala assistant at OmniView) 125,000, Joe Salvani (Hired Stock Promoter/Consultant of CodeSmart) 312,500, OmniView Capital (owned by Wexler and Discala) 362,500, ECPC 187,500, Darren Ofsink 125,000, Craig Josephberg (a stockbroker arrested with DiScala) 368,750, and Lucy Ostrovsky 125,000 shares. Documents from Ofsink’s office say all these shares were prices at $2.3 cents.

People involved in the investigation told this reporter the SEC was working on their own investigation and the Eastern DOJ rushed the charges when they thought Discala was going to leave the country and had offshore accounts set up to hide money. The DOJ learned after Discala’s arrest he was just planning a trip to Europe so his wife’s parents could meet their 10-week old daughter. Discala, who grew up in a prominent East Coast family of lawyers and real estate moguls, has deep roots in the United States. The FBI raided Discala seaside home in Rowayton, Conn. at 6am waking up his wife and baby girl who were alone in the house. Mrs. Discala told FBI special agent Michael C. Braconi her husband was on business in Las Vegas. AJ Discala waited at his Wynn Hotel room for the feds to arrest him and a Vegas federal judge release him to fly home on his own without a bond. A few days later the eastern DOJ prosecutor, Walter Norkin, reneged on a verbal bail agreement Discala’s attorney had made and got a judge to agree to strict bail requirements putting Mr. Discala on home confinement and post a $2 million bond. The bond was secured by his family’s homes. Court transcripts show Norkin believed, based on their wire taps, Discala and crew were planning to commit more securities fraud in a company called Scanbuy that AJ was raising capital for. A notion Discala finds absurd and without a fact basis. After the arrest Scanbuy pulled Discala’s advisory contract.

CodeSmart Needed More Capital

Discala had told the shell investors that Joe Salvani’s friend at a boutique investment bank called Axiom was set to fund a $4mn PIPE deal to help make sure the company had working capital after the reverse merger was complete. Discala had also met with Axiom who assured him they were on board to fund the PIPE transaction. Based on emails, interviews with people involved in the deal and copies of a contract; Randy Fields of Axiom committed his firm on May 15th, 2013 to a $4 million PIPE investment in return for a $22,500 retainer and $1.5 million of CodeSmart common stock. After the reverse merger was complete Axiom backed out of the PIPE financing. Randy Fields did not return a request for comment asking why his firm did not fund the deal. At that point Discala choose to help find investors in the PIPE, raising only $2,624,300 million at $3 per share of common stock which was a 17% discount to the stock on the day it closed June 5th, 2013. Investors included: Marc Wexler, Discala’s father Joseph Discala, Omniview Capital, and ECPC a firm that also invested in the bridge loan. All received discounted stock that was restricted. Codesmart never made interest payments on the PIPE deal and ECPC was given 400,000 shares of unrestricted stock as an ‘advisor’ in the PIPE according to emails and SEC filings.

Before the PIPE was funded, emails show Salvani, worked with deal finder Eli Washrsager, to negotiate a $20 million financing contract with Sam Chanin, CEO of Factor CU Financing. The $20 million facility would lend $4000 of tuition per student for programs that went through the CodeSmart University; an online training program. Discala used the signed contract by Chanin to help convince others to invest in the PIPE financing. But on June 20th, CodeSmart CEO Ira Shapiro tried to change the financing agreement and Chanin sent an email to Salvani and Wahrsager that he was backing out of the deal. Discala says in hindsight this was a pattern he says Shapiro repeated; promising investors contracts that never came to fruition. Salvani and Wahrsager did not respond for comment regarding their role in this deal. The canceled Chanin contract was a big problem for CodeSmart’s growth strategy. But investors never learned about the failed financing; which likely would have deflated the stock’s value that was already trading above $6 only two months after becoming a public company.

Meanwhile Shapiro and Salvani got a small time research group called Umbrella Research to write an analyst report with a price target of $12 that was promoted on the CodeSmart website and sent around to main street investors who were clients of the two arrested stockbrokers. The brokers are Matthew Bell and Craig Josephberg (known as Jobo). Discala says Salvani offered Umbrella $50,000 to write the research report but never paid the firm. Discala covered the bill after it went unpaid so Umbrella could get the report published. Checks seen by this reporter were then paid by Umbrella to three of Salvani’s LLC’s who had been gifted unrestricted stock as part of his investor relations/ marketing consulting agreement. The checks say they are buying CodeSmart shares in what appears to be a sale of stock via a secondary transaction. Umbrella research told this reporter CodeSmart CEO Ira Shapiro told Umbrella to buy the shares from Salvani. It is unclear why CodeSmart didn’t grant the shares directly to the research firm. Salvani’s three firms (JFS Investments, Hudson Park Capital, and Draper Inc.) each received $583 for a total of around $1600 from Umbrella Research. Umbrella analyst, Joe Giamichael, told this reporter they put a $12 buy rating on CodeSmart in their initial research report but were not informed a PIPE deal was planned to follow the reverse merger which would have changed their price target.

“Unfortunately immediately after our initiation, management chose to do a placement at a huge discount to market and did not want to entertain any of the capital formation suggestions we had. Our relationship with management drastically deteriorated after that,” analyst Joe Giamichael told this reporter in an interview.

Umbrella also said on the record they did not work with AJ Discala or Joe Salvani in any way to prepare the research report. It took Umbrella until April 2014 to downgrade the stock after it was trading below $1.

Positive press releases kept coming out the company touting contracts with universities to use CodeSmart’s training but then the contracts were never fulfilled. The analyst covering the stock and CodeSmart’s CFO, Diego Roca, were questioning if Ira Shapiro was every telling the truth about his company’s earning potential. At its height the stock reached near $7 and went through a 2 for 1 stock split, doubling the unrestricted shares for CodeSmart early investors.

The Justice Department indictment states Discala was part of a group that wrote false or misleading press releases. Jules Abramson, who was hired as outside press for CodeSmart, told this reporter Discala was not part of the press release writing; except to approve one quote in one release that announced Omniview had been hired latter in 2013 as a business consultant to help the company meet its financial targets. Abramson said Ira Shapiro provided the press release information which was vetted and approved by attorney Daren Ofsink office. After the company went public Ofsink also served as corporate attorney for CodeSmart while he was still AJ Discala’s attorney.

A few months after CodeSmart was trading publicly the stock started to take a slide. Discala and a former CFO of the company, Diego Roca, both told this reporter they could see short action in the stock. It is hard to short micro-cap stocks unless a broker dealer is allowing naked shorting because there is often not enough outstanding stock on the market to borrow for the short action. A broker dealer, like Garden State Securities, could have helped make the short action happen but only a regulator would get access to trading records to prove this. Discala had gotten some original CodeSmart investors to sign ‘lock-up’ agreements. These contracts, seen by this reporter, say the holder of unrestricted shares has to hold their shares for 60 days after the reverse merger and can’t sell off more than 5% of the stock they hold at a time. But Discala believes not everyone was honoring those agreements.

Fighting the Short Squeeze

As the stock slide and hovered around $2-$3 Discala was working on another $1.5 million long-term private equity placement agreement for CodeSmart. But it had conditions for Shapiro to put in more internal controls and allow Discala his own board members. Discala also started to ‘gift’ stock his companies owned to the stockbrokers he was working with so they could sell it to their clients who were losing value in their CodeSmart stock. The regulators complaint says Discala and Wexler were dumping their shares and got brokers Bell and Jobo to sell more shares to their clients. The regulators complaint shows Bell telling his clients they could buy CodeSmart for only .19 when it was trading above $2 that day. Discala says he gave away the shares at his cost to what he invested in CodeSmart so people would not rush to sell their shares during the short squeeze. The government is arguing that regardless of profit the timed buying and selling of stock Discala and Wexler were doing equals a match trade. In their view these transaction are market manipulation to create an appearance of market activity by more than a few players. Discala will argue he is a long-term investor trying to support a stock against short sellers. In November 2013, Shapiro fired Discala and OmniView as advisors to raise capital. Ofsink, acting as attorney for CodeSmart, tried to get Discala to sign an agreement absolving Shapiro and CodeSmart from any liability in canceling their consulting contract with OmniView. Discala declined and hired a private investigation firm to go over all the deal documents and public filings of CodeSmart. Those findings were seen by this reporter and were also binders that the FBI seized from Discala’s office the day of his arrest.
Meanwhile Shapiro continued to work with Garden State Securities; the broker-dealer where Salvani’s pal Dan Walsh worked. CFO Diego Roca told this reporter Garden State introduced CodeSmart to Redwood Fund II a Florida-based firm that did small SPA transactions for them. Redwood sold multiple deals, valued at $50,000 to $100,000 each, of short-term debt to discounted equity to funds like: Black Mountain Equities, Magana Equities, Fife Trading and their own Redwood fund. The deals are called SPA’s and were completed at the end of 2013 through spring 2014. Redwood is run by Gary Rodgers and John DeNobile. CodeSmart CFO Diego Roca told this reporter it was the only funding they could get on the market and were always running out of cash because of Shapiro’s spending and unfulfilled contracts. He publicly filed an 8-k when he quit CodeSmart in April 2014 saying he could not support the actions of management. Diego told this reporter the SEC told him they had tried to subpoena records from CodeSmart before the arrest were made and Shapiro ignored them. After the arrest of his CEO, Diego Roca came back into the company as the Chief Restructuring Officer and has turned over company emails and records to the SEC. Deigo says he was told he is not under SEC investigation and was not arrested by the DOJ.

Before Discala was arrested in July he was interviewing lawyers to sue CodeSmart for fraud as an outside investor in the firm. Discala expressed concern over what he sees as Ofsink’s conflict of interest while he was attorney for him and CodeSmart. (Ofsink was not arrested by the DOJ or sued by the SEC and did not respond for comment for this story.) In fact, emails starting on June 7th between former CFO Roca and Ofsink, show Ofsink knew the FBI was investigating CodeSmart before Discala was arrested in late July because the FBI tried to go to homes of the CodeSmart executive’s homes. According to Discala, Ofsink never warned his client, Discala, of this; who was being wired tapped at the time. The DOJ’s complaint list three confidential witnesses against Discala; AJ has yet to learn their identities.

The SEC is supposed to give a defendant notice they plan to charge or bring an enforcement action against a firm. The defendant is then given a chance to come in and do an interview. Often this process is called receiving a ‘wells notice’ and public companies have to disclose in SEC filings this is happening so stock investors are informed. None of this happen in the CodeSmart case and it was only in August that the SEC started to push subpoenas and document request in the stocks Discala and crew were arrested for. The SEC can claim because the DOJ thought Discala was planning to leave the country with money they could get an ex partie order and circumvent standard civil rights Discala should have. AJ Discala plans to fight this case to trial and recently hired former micro-cap enforcement lawyer for the SEC Tom Sporkin. Sporkin, who spent 20 years with the SEC, is a now a partner at Buckley and Sandler LP.

Sporkin told this reporter, “I will be asking for a bill of particulars right away.” Sporkin will do this because the government needs to show how the text messages between two business partners correlate to the exact timing of stocks being bought and sold. This would be a defense to the governments’ accusation of wash or match trades. The government could also try to prove Discala and team were to trying to support an upward price of the stock to benefit a larger scheme if say they or any of their affiliate companies had bought call options in CodeSmart. A call option would bet that the price of CodeSmart stock will go up to a certain price at a date in the future.

The SEC is expected to agree to a stay of their civil complaint while the defense litigates the DOJ’s criminal charges. Discala was kept on an ankle bracelet keeping him confined to him home for over 45 days. A federal judge ordered it cut off last week. The government also admitted in legal filings they overstated Discala’s wealth and he does not have a $7 million trust fund as they touted in the arresting press release. Early in this case we already have the DOJ admitting to errors to get an arrest. Court documents show the government seized bank accounts with less than $200,000 in them and the Discala family was allowed only $30,000 to live on. As a condition of his bail agreement Discala is currently out of the money-raising business.

Editor Note: This case is a unique opportunity for the SEC to make case law on how far institutional investors in mirco cap stocks can go to get traction in a stock. There is little question Discala and Wexler had a plan to support an upward price movement in the stocks they invested in. Hedge Funds get together often and plan large buys or sells in a stock, which Company CEO’s don’t always find ethical but our securities laws allow it. Without big name analyst research and a large bank like Goldman or Morgan Stanley taking a company public small cap stocks face large challenges in going public to raise capital. They don’t have the funds or capital to pay for expensive IPO’s; that is why a reverse merger has been favorable in the past. The Jobs act and the rules the SEC is currently making for RegA Plus are trying to address these hefty cost for small cap companies and give them better access to capital. But this is slow to come. In Discala’s case he was trying to use an alternate public offering to get the stock to move. Is this criminal? Unless he is naked shorting, falsifying press releases, selling restricted shares with illegal opinion letters from attorneys ,there is a large question looming if Discala really broke any laws. Do Discala and Wexler face technical violations of the 1934 Securities law- maybe? Everyone who invest in a stock wants it to go up. The Street will be watching this case to see how far the courts allow pre-ipo investors in companies to get upward movement and an active market in micro-cap stocks. Lorretta Lynch’s DOJ boss in D.C. will be watching to see if she overreached in charging Discala or if she can finally get a conviction in a Wall Street case. I will be watching if Joe Salvani or Darren Ofsink also get arrested for their role in Codesmart.

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Banker Peyton Patterson Won’t Pay Her Taxes

Peyton Reed Patterson, now former CEO of Bankwell, apparently doesn’t like to pay taxes. On Thursday the regional bank announced Ms. Patterson was quitting as CEO for personal reasons. This is two months after Matt Pilon of the Hartford Business Journal exposed the multi-millionaire banker for being a deadbeat with her creditors. In fact these creditors have secured court judgments against her for over $400k. This included contractors for her new McMansion in New Canaan, country club bills, and back real estate taxes owed to Madison, Conn.

What hasn’t been reported yet is Peyton Patterson also doesn’t like to pay taxes to New Canaan. A town records search shows New Canaan filed a tax lien on June 5th, 2014 against the banker for $36,146.63 and the tax assessor office shows she still hasn’t paid this year’s taxes. In fact, since she moved to town in mid 2012 she hasn’t really been timely in paying any taxes on her $4.2 million home at 112 Clearview Lane.

Peyton garnered years of glowing press from local and national media on her track record of buying and selling banks or raising money to bring them public. She’s a dealmaker kind of CEO who reportedly made over $16 million in 2011 on a deal she did with New Haven’s NewAlliance Bancshares. So how does this divorced single mom, who is clearly a double-digit million now, not have the cash to pay her damn taxes? She won’t answer reporter questions so maybe someone close to her will speak up and share what in the world is going on. As a CEO of a public company (well now a once CEO of Bankwell) shareholders have a right know why the leader of their bank, who is in charge of money, can’t seem to manager her own finances.

In April 2012 it appears she look $1.2 million from the NewAlliance deal payday and made a down payment on a huge 8,000ish square foot McMansion in ultra rich New Canaan, Conn. Town records show she then borrowed $3 million from Bank of America to fund the rest of the home purchase. So it’s not like she used up a bunch cash to buy a $4.2 million house out right. Which brings us back to question of why she’d risk her stellar reputation as a smart female CEO banker to not pay trade workers or pay taxes that fund schools and roads in the towns she lives in.

Something doesn’t add up. Is Payton a closet ultra Libertarian and doesn’t believe in paying any taxes? I would love to hear local residents or people who know Peyton and tell us what you think is going on.

Peyton Patterson Tax Lein

Iroquois Capital’s Josh Silverman Threatens Portfolio Stock CEO

UPDATE 7-3-14: I am reporting at Growth Capitalist hedgie Josh Silverman pulled their support of a New Jersey gaming permit for MGT in what appears to be a retaliation move against MGT CEO Robert Ladd for speaking to the press.

Original Text
There is a dirty battle going on between activist hedgies Josh Silverman / Richard Abbe and the CEO of an online gaming company his hedge fund, Iroquois Capital, invested in. I reported today for Growth Capitalist that MGT Capital Investments CEO, Robert Ladd, thinks he has found a paper trail that could show Iroquois was parking stock to hide stock ownership above 10 percent. It could lead to violations of Section 16 of the 1934 Securities Act for Iroquois and the affiliate he allegedly works with Jay Spinner. (In 2006 Spinner was issued an enforcement action by the SEC for his role in an illegal short selling scheme. He did not admit or deny guilt and was banned from the industry for only 6 months.)

Iroquois Master fund made a $1 million PIPE investment into MGT in October 2012. MGT also did a registered direct offering on the same day as the PIPE deal with Jay Spinner’s company, Ellis International, who bought 200,000 shares of MGT via the RDO. Spinner has an office in Iroquois NYC office but is not believed to be an employee of the fund. Iroquois has a 9.99% stake in MGT and Spinner had bought a 6.7% stake. Ladd is alleging through a serious of transaction these two positions acted as a group and Iroquois stake in his company was really more than 10%.

It was during my month-long investigation into how this transaction was set up I learned CEO Ladd and his CFO Robert Traversa had been verbally threatened by Silverman after Ladd refused to allow the hedge fund activist to put his own people on the board of Ladd’s public company MGT Capital Investments. Silverman invited Ladd to come to his New York City office and said, “I am going to crush you and drive your stock down to 50 cents.”

It’s rare I hear a hedge fund manager be this aggressive and bold and even rarer the CEO is willing to go on the record–but they did. After the threat, Silverman then issued two public letters, filed with the SEC, railing on Ladd’s management choices and compensation.

If Iroquois, who invested via a PIPE deal, did own more than 10% of MGT’s stock and was selling stock for a profit, securities law says he would have had to reinvest the profits back into the company. Ladd thinks Silverman made profits off his stock in the millions and those millions should have legally been reinvested into the company. But without a regulator forcing the hedge fund to turn over trading records this is going to be very costly and difficult for the small cap company CEO to prove.

There is also sentiment that Ladd made his own bed by allowing Iroquois to invest in his fund in the first place and get preferred stock with voting rights. Ladd had previously run his own small hedge fund called Ladd Capital and isn’t a unsophisticated investor.

Ladd’s $MGT is now facing short selling pressure but the CEO doesn’t have the legal means to investigate who is doing the shorting. Even in the aftermath of Dodd-Frank legislation it is still extremely tough to see a hedge fund’s trading records.

Silverman and Jay Spinner refused to answer any questions for Growth Capitalist but two days before the story ran Silverman published a public letter with the SEC calling out Ladd once again for what he views as poor management choices and then alluded to Ladd starting a ‘smear campaign’ against the hedge fund. I saw this as nothing more than a public relations move by Iroquois to get some spin into the news that his fund might have violated SEC laws. And a bully tactic against a CEO who won’t let him on his board.

Sometimes in a PIPE transaction when a hedge fund has a large block of stock or warrants or debt they are not holding onto them with hope the company stock will improve on performance. Instead they are hoping the company goes bankrupt so they can gut the assets of the company and get them for cheap. At Growth Capitalist we’ve seen Iroquois focus on investing in companies with patents or intellectual property. MGT Capital has a valuable patent but it’s currently in litigation. It’s this reporters opinion that Iroquois wants downward pressure on MGT Captial Investment stock so it can hurt the company financially and buy their patent on the cheap when the company is short for cash or bankrupt. Another way they could have made money on the company is having a larger short position than they do a long position and use other affiliate funds or people to buy these short positions.

To read the documented paper trail of how Silverman set up this possible illegal investment strategy click here. It’s free to register for the first 30 days and the excellent story reporting is a cautionary tale of how some hedge funds can skirt the law for profit and sadly destroy company value.

Biotech Firm NanoVircidies Sued For Executives Abuse of Assets

A Biotech company whose stock is soaring this year has caught the eye of short sellers after recent SEC filings showed possible self-dealings with company assets by its founders. I reported for Growth Capitalist last week, NanoViricides ($NNVC), was sued by a group of early angel investors in a shareholder derivative suit, filed in Colorado federal court, claiming company executives Anil Diwan and Eugene Seymour are abusing company assets and have breached their fiduciary duties. Yet last month the budding development company was still able to raise over $10 million through Midtown Partners with a private after market stock sale called a registered direct offering.

The RDO was offered to institutional investors at a discount of 26% percent. This means they can buy the stock after the close at the discounted price and then sell it into the market the next day at a profit. It creates trading volume in the stock but not necessarily long term value for main street investors because the hedge funds who buy the deal usually just dump the stock. Midtown Partners has done multiple RDO’s for NanoViricides raising over $30 million before fees in the last three years. But the recent offering apparently needed some help getting sold because Midtown, the placement agent, also had to offer 5 year stock warrants at $5.25.

When I asked Midtown Partners, Prakash Mandgi, about the pricing on the deal he tried to spin the terms explaining it was done at “a 20% discount to the 20 day volume weighted average price at closing and the warrants were issued at 120% of the 20 day vwap at closing”. Now here is why that is a suspect answer.

Instead of giving me the discount from the market price at the close of the day of the deal, he gave me the discount from the 20 day volume weighted average price. But, and this is important, traders do not compute NAV at 20 day VWAP prices, they mark to the closing market price. He was comparing apples to oranges.

So the units for $NNVC’s recent capital raise were priced at a deep discount (no matter how you spin it). The deep discount stock was not enough, however, and the deal also included warrants. The strike price of the warrants was at a premium to the “20 day VWAP”. Now, in the same way that the discount on the stock looks smaller if you use “20 day VWAP” instead of market price, the premium of the warrants looks greater when you use the “20 day VWAP”.

Here is an example of how this spin pricing works:

$NNVC Market price: 4.76
20 day VWAP price: 4.25
Deal/RDO Price: 3.50

So in this scenario the discount to the market price is 26.4% 1-(3.5/4.76)
The discount to the 20 Day VWAP price is 17.6% 1-(3.5/4.25)

To spin the deal as not being as bad, the bucketshop bankers like to talk about the discount from the VWAP price. Watch out if you hear your small cap stock broker or banker talk this way.

Now lets add the warrant pricing.

$NNVC Warrant Strike Price: $5.25
Market Price: 4.76
20 Day VWAP: 4.25

The strike price of the warrant computed using market price is 110% (5.25/4.76)
The strike price computed using VWAP price is 123% (5.25/4.25)

So using the VWAP price makes the warrants look less valuable. The lower the strike the more valuable the warrant. Bankers using VWAP pricing is a way to make the deal look less egregious than it really is.

Now NanoViricides CEO Eugene Seymour is fully aware of this magic math. Short sellers like Joe Spiegel of Dalek Capital Management, say they remember Seymour from a 90’s biotech stock that pumped up its share price but left long term investors in a dump. When Spiegel saw stock promoter, Patrick Cox, pumping the stock in 2010 he thought that signaled an opportunity to short it. One of the reasons listed in the investor lawsuit was that Cox had allegedly received inside information about a special biotech credit the company ‘might’ be able to get which would be worth millions of dollars. Cox allegedly published this info in his investor newsletter and the stock took a ride up. It also crashed latter when the info didn’t pan out. The suit also alleges there is a new stock promoter named ‘DrFeelGood’ who uses $NNVC stock message boards to rally interest in the stock with inside information. A look at the trading volume right before the biotech company files a press releases is something a regulator could be inspecting if they learn the stock promoters did not disclose they were getting paid to promote the stock or if they really did get inside info and traded against it.

NanoViricides hasn’t filed a response in Federal court yet to the investor claims and did not return a request for comment.

The medical technology they are working to build out, using plastic to attach to diseased cells and flush them through the blood stream, is possible but so far reads like a science project. Instead of news about the company completing medical trials investors keep hearing about their recent listing on the NYSE Mkt (the old AMEX or Scamex as some traders called it).

The details of how co-founder Anil Diwan is using $NVCC’s stock and balance sheet for side deals that benefit him personally can be found in my Growth Capitalist story.

SunTrust Pays a Billion for cheating Fannie & Freddie on Mortgage Loans

This week we learned SunTrust had to pay around a billion dollars to settle with the government over the mortgage fraud they committed against the GSEs. News of this investigation detailing how the bank committed the fraud was first reported by me at finance trade publication Growth Capitalist in November 2012. This means there is a high probability SunTrust knew for over a year they would have to pay a large fine for these actions but instead they kept telling shareholders their legacy mortgage problems with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were behind them.

Original news report Nov 2012 for Growth Capitalist:

November 5, 2012 by Teri Buhl

SunTrust under SEC Investigation

Atlanta-based SunTrust Banks (STI) is under investigation by regulators for alleged mortgage fraud against Fannie Mae. Whistleblowers who worked in SunTrust’s residential mortgage underwriting group filed a whistleblower suit with the Securities and Exchange Commission this spring. After the Washington, D.C. office of the SEC received the complaint a director of the SEC’s Atlanta office and a forensic accountant were assigned to begin an immediate investigation in the bank. Three people involved in the case told Growth Capital Investor interviews with SunTrust employees who worked in the bank’s mortgage unit started in May, along with an inspection of the methods SunTrust used to qualify prime loans sold to Fannie Mae.

SunTrust saw its stock price fall off a cliff in the financial crisis, and subsequently participated in the federal TARP program aimed at shoring up distressed banks. Investors who held the stock valued at $73 a share in October 2007 watched their investment wiped out when it fell to $7 by February 2009. Distressed investors who bought the stock in the high-teens at the end of 2011 have now witnessed a near 50% rise in the stock as the bank paid off its TARP funds and increased mortgage lending. Analysts started to boast buy ratings on the stock this year and Jefferies currently has a $32 price target on SunTrust.

But as bank executives have worked to clean up the troubled balance sheet created during its go-go lending years, 2005 to early 2008, the prior actions of its mortgage team could still place a dent in future profitability.

SunTrust financials show since 2005 they sold $233 billion of loans, with the bulk being bought by the GSEs (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). SunTrust built a special relationship with Fannie Mae who allowed them to have a custom underwriting system that connected to Fannie’s automated mortgage buying program. The Desktop Underwriter program, or DU, was designed to buy prime residential loans from banks like SunTrust who were heavy volume mortgage originators. The Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of Inspector General reported in an audit of Fannie’s lending standards that more 1,500 banks originated loans through the DU program in 2010, comprising 71% of all loans bought by the GSE. All SunTrust had to do was meet the right mix of income and personal asset qualifiers, enter them into Fannie’s DU system, and the loan was swiftly bought off the bank’s books, freeing up reserves for new loans. Fannie would then book these loans as ‘lender selected’ prime loans, even though there was little human inspection of the documents that qualified the borrower.

The SunTrust whistleblower complaint says bank executives then taught underwriters how to ‘trip the DU system’ to make it accept loans that were actually less than prime quality. All SunTrust had to do was make sure they were scored right and their custom DU Fannie Mae program even allowed them to re-enter borrower data multiple times until they got the right score. Internal documents from SunTrust management show how to avoid red flags or “beat the Fannie Mae DU system.” One whistleblower explains how they re-entered a borrower’s income ten times until they got the right acceptance score. Snapshots of these repeated DU data runs were turned over to the SEC in the whistleblower complaint along with internal memos that encourage underwriters to “get loans” into the DU systems.

“We knew we were making Alt-A loans but Fannie thought they we were selling them prime,” said one former SunTrust employee. “Then the bank would also book the loan as Prime because that’s what Fannie bought. This amounted to billions of Alt-A loans booked as Prime.”

Regulators are now looking at how SunTrust learned to beat Fannie’s underwriting system.

Bill Singer, a former regulatory attorney who reviewed the whistleblower claims, told Growth Capital Investor, “Given the allegations involving Fannie Mae’s auto-underwriting system, one truly has to wonder just what oversight and controls Fannie had in terms of the integrity of the data entered into its system, and, further, for the data entry interface itself. Beyond the necessary due diligence inherent in vetting the underwriting data, Fannie was also obligated, I would think, to make sure that its interface was not being gamed.”

The SEC is currently working with the mortgage task force, set up by the Obama administration, to investigate and prosecute individuals and financial institutions who contributed to criminal or civil violations that led to the financial crisis. The national watchdog includes prosecuting attorneys from the Department of Justice, state attorneys general, and securities enforcement attorneys.

“If it turns out that not only was fraudulent qualification data repeatedly submitted to Fannie but that the computerized interface was routinely over-ridden by laddering an applicant’s net worth, income, and assets in increasingly higher levels during a data-input session, the wrongdoing is no longer sourced solely from the originating bank but the finger must also be pointed at Fannie,” says Singer.

A third quarter earning presentation says the bank had $6.4 billion of mortgage repurchase requests – put-backs of under-performing or deficient mortgages by Fannie to the mortgage originator – with repurchase demand increasing 9% in Q2. Of that number only $1.4 billion have been recognized as a charge-off on SunTrust books.

In September SunTrust told investors the amount of money they reserve for repurchase requests was going to increase. The bank’s leadership claimed the increase was a direct result of conversations with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac along with a review of full loan files, conversations that appear to have happened after the SEC began its investigation this May. When a bank adds to repurchase reserves it affects a bank’s capital levels, regulatory ratios and bottom line. SunTrust claims the 140% increase to repurchase reserves over the previous quarter should be the last significant increase to reserves.

Aleem Gillani, SunTrust CFO, told investors during its third quarter earnings call this month, “Our third quarter mortgage repurchase provision was $371 million. Consistent with last month’s announcement, we expect the resulting mortgage repurchase reserve to be sufficient to cover the estimated remaining losses from pre-2009 vintage loans sold to the GSEs.”

But analysts doubt the residential mortgage repurchases are over for SunTrust considering they also added another $400 million of repurchase requests in the third quarter. Repurchase requests are made on loans from 2005 to 2012. Ken Usdin, a Jefferies senior equity analyst, wrote on October 22 the downside scenario for SunTrust is, “mortgage repurchase losses are not done and litigation expense remains elevated.” SunTrust says of the third quarter repurchase demands, $78 million are from 2006, $213 million are 2007 vintage, and $68 million are 2008 vintage.

“If SunTrust was sued for not disclosing risk to its shareholders or civil mortgage fraud the SEC would ask for damages and three times those damages as a penalty,” says Singer.

SunTrust isn’t the only one regulators think gamed the GSE’s mortgage buying system. On October 25the Department of Justice filed a civil suit against Bank of America’s Countrywide unit for similar actions against the GSEs described in the SunTrust whistleblower suit. The DOJ claims the GSEs suffered at least $1 billion in losses from loans Countrywide sold that didn’t actually meet the standards they said they did.

In an email sent by one of the SunTrust whistleblowers after he read the Countrywide fraud suit, he said, “Two pages into reading this complaint it’s the same as ours just under a different name.”

A SunTrust spokesperson would not comment on the whistleblower claim or an SEC investigation. The SEC said it doesn’t comment on investigations. Former Fannie CEO, Daniel Mudd, is currently fighting a SEC securities suit that alleges the Fannie executive knew the bank was buying billions of less than prime loans in 2006 and 2007 but didn’t disclose this risk to shareholders.

Regulators Investigating Firms Sub-Account Use in Shorting Stocks

Government regulators are investigating investment firms that set up sub-accounts with their broker dealers to mask illegal short selling schemes. I reported for Growth Capitalist this week that FINRA and the SEC are currently doing a sweep of hedge funds and their brokers dealers for the use of sub-account under the hedge funds master account to essentially naked short a stock.

The regulatory investigation is on top of the short selling fines the SEC imposed on 22 firms last month. The government is focused on how firms short a stock within a five day rule before a new issue for the stock – which is basically naked shorting.

The use of sub-accounts, sometimes set up in names of people who are not actually the investor in the funds, is similar to the ‘rathole’ game Jordan Belfort used in the mid-90’s at his illustrious Long Island firm Stratton Oakmont. You might remember Belfort from his tell-all novel ‘The Wolf of Wall Street’ – which is now going to be a lucid and greedy portrayal of what can happen behind the scenes with stock trading in a major motion picture this year.

But regulators aren’t just looking at bucket shops trying to use straw buyers. Even if a real investor’s money is being used to short a stock in the subaccount, while the Master account is long the stock, say five days before a new issue (illegal practice Rule 105), FINRA or the SEC is likely to come after the firm. And they’ll fine the broker-dealers for not inspecting what the hedge funds are doing via compliance violations even if the broker-dealer had little or no intent on allowing the hedgie to do illegal trading.

Last year the poster child for this kind of scheme, William Yeh of Genesis Securities, was banned from nearly every stock exchange for what he did with master and subaccounts. You can read all about Yeh’s scheme in the FINRA lawsuit here.

I am now seeing Wall Street securities lawyers warning their clients to be on guard for this kind of thing:

Master/sub-account relationships raise a host of regulatory issues for firms and carry the risk that the firm does not know the identity of its “customer” as required by federal securities laws, including the Customer Identification Program (CIP) provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act, and FINRA Rule 3310. In some situations, despite the fact that there is an intermediary master account, a firm may be required to recognize a sub-account as a separate customer of the firm. FINRA examiners closely review firms’ procedures for determining the beneficial ownership of each account within a master/sub-account structure in accordance with the guidance published in Regulatory Notice 10-18. FINRA examiners will review firms’ systems for monitoring, detecting and reporting suspicious activity in master/sub-account structures, whether or not the sub-account should be considered the firm’s customer for CIP purposes.

And FINRA says it’s using 16 examiners to figure out if a hedgie/traders master account is basically being allowed to operate as an unregistered broker-dealer:

FINRA examiners also will focus on whether the firm is properly monitoring transactions in master/sub-account structures for potentially manipulative activity and reporting that activity, as appropriate, on a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR). In a recent enforcement action, FINRA sanctioned a firm for failing to adopt risk-based procedures to verify the identity of sub-account holders, even though these customers lived overseas in high-risk jurisdictions and could freely execute trades for their own profit, and also for failing to adopt effective procedures for detecting suspicious activity.

The problem with these regulator inspections is master/sub-account relationships have now also raised issues under other FINRA and SEC rules, such as margin rules and books and records requirements. Meaning firms could get hit with a ‘net-capital charge’ if the regulator thinks there is prop trading in the sub account and the real owner who reaps the dollars is different than the master account.

This is seen as a ‘Johnny Come Lately’ action by the SEC and FINRA by some small cap stock CEO’s who have been made to look like lunatics for complaining about naked shorting over the last decade and our Chris Cox/ Mary Shapiro style of leadership at the SEC did nothing about it. Others think it’s a witch hunt by the SEC because Main Street is frustrated at their total lack of getting BIG fines out of traders who break securities laws and keep making millions of dollars.

JP Morgan Shareholders: I told You RMBS Settlements Would be Mega Billions

The U.S. government and its regulators want a lot of money from Jamie Dimon’s bank because they think the institutions it owns did some really bad things when selling mortgage backed securities to every tom, dick and harry on The Street. This is a story I’ve done original reporting on for three years now starting at The Atlantic, then DealFlow Media, and have made multiple appearances on RT’s Keiser Report warning their RMBS fraud settlement will be huge. In fact, I told Max Keiser viewers in early 2011 it would be around $10 billion and then watched traders on the street shake their heads at me because they just couldn’t imagine it.

This wasn’t because I had a crystal ball and guessed right. It was because I knew the amount of documented evidence and whistleblowers against JP Morgan / Bear Stearns was so strong that the number would have to appear big to the general public; so our Too Slow To Do Anything regulators might appear like financial crime cops and say they got a big number out of JPM. Of course if the SEC, DOJ or NYAG had done something when the mortgage insurers first started to complain about Tom Marano’s (Bear Stearns Head of Mortgages) rmbs team not buying back faulty loans, like their contract said they would in 2007, just think of all the actual bond losses, and jobs, and individuals net worth that might not have been wiped out.

Now we see my peers in the financial press are just starting to wake up to the fact that JP Morgan is going to have to pay mega billions (like $10 billion plus) to settle fraud claims for the role of Bear Stearns mortgage traders during the housing boom and few other illegal things they did related to mortgages. That’s about two quarters of net profit for JP Morgan.

JP Morgan doesn’t want to make this settlement; especially if they have to admit guilt or wrong doing because that could cement more civil fraud settlements by all the investors who bought the bank’s RMBS. According to JPM’s quarterly filings, those investors equal at least $160 billion of private rmbs litigation these days. And while JPM is a very profitable bank ($2.4 trillion in assets) making money hand over fist it doesn’t have enough cash to payoff all those private rmbs suits at the dollar amount they could likely legally win if they ever went to trial.

Last month we saw JPM settle its first RMBS fraud suit with one of the monolines, Assured Guarantee. This suit, filed by top lawyers at Patterson Belknap, was key in finding over 30 whistleblowers to detail a mafia like level of deceit/cover up and out right stealing from their own damn clients. It also showed that in mid 2008 when JP Morgan found out about the really bad stuff Bear was doing they created a plan to : delay contractual payouts agreed upon and just up and change the calculations on mortgage loan defaults/payouts that Bear/EMC had been using so they didn’t have to pay the monolines around $1 billion of rmbs putbacks in 2008. Yep you heard me right. The monoline lawyers at PBWT found buckets of emails from JPM executives spelling out this nifty little plan. That’s why a NY State judge, Ramos, allowed JP Morgan to be sued for fraudulent conveyance in the Assured case. Because JPM flat out knew Bear committed fraud and in 2008 didn’t want ( or couldn’t afford) to pay it.

The Assured settlement was confidential of course but people close to the settlement told me Assured was ‘thrilled with the settlement number’ and it was close to the near $100 million of putbacks they were suing for. JPM didn’t admit wrong doing in this case but they sure spoke with their wallet by paying Assured once the monoline had secured most of their claims through beating JPM’s motion to dismiss.

So now we have the DOJ, NYAG, & FHFA wanting to see Jamie Dimon admit his bank owes RMBS investors a lot of money. The FHFA has been leaking settlement numbers to Kara Scannell at the FT for a few weeks now. The first number she reported was they were asking JPM for $6bn for the crap rmbs sold to Fannie and Freddie (the GSEs). Then we watched the DOJ, who always calls the WSJ went they want to get a message out, report the DOJ wanted $3bn and JPM said no way. When we see settlement numbers get reported like this it means the government is desperate to push a bank into a deal. They use press embarrassment and ‘lets scare the shareholders’ to get the bank to settle and my peers blindly print whatever the government tells them. The only journalist (besides me) I’ve seen continually follow the evidence/litigation against JPM with detailed, insightful analysis is Alison Frankel – a Reuters legal columnist.

Don’t let press reports of JPM adding to its litigation reserves fool you into thinking they’ve been properly setting aside money to pay this hefty bill. Unfortunately most of my peers in the financial press don’t know how to read the tricky accounting language JP Morgan uses to hide their problems and JPM doesn’t tell shareholders how the litigation reserves will be used. Heck, for all we know it could all be set aside to sue Max Keiser because they are sick of his ‘Buy Silver crash JP Morgan’ campaign. The amount of money JPM has set aside and the amount of money they have paid out in rmbs putbacks and litigation is often inaccurately reported or not reported at all because no one can figure it out.

The story these days isn’t really the number JP Morgan will pay, but the payout number compared to the legal reserves they have been booking. This is something I was first to highlight in May 2012 and now we see Bloomberg commentator Josh Rosner calling JPM out on the same issue–which is a good start but everyone of my fellow reporters covering this story should be writing about this at the top of their stories.

You see JPM’s legal reserves hit their bottom line (and their regulatory capital levels) so they don’t want to admit they will have to pay this money until the very last minute. But that’s not really fair to shareholders. In fact we don’t ever get see what is the current amount JPM is holding in their legal reserves. What we see is a reasonable estimate of what COULD be added to their legal reserves and it’s hidden in a footnote. Last quarter that footnote estimated it was ‘reasonably possible’ that around $6.8 billion could be added to legal reserves; but this number doesn’t effect their balance sheet it’s a just an estimate the auditors make them write.

We do see litigation expense, which comes right off the income statement and effects net profit, but that has been really small number this year ($400mn in Q2 and $300mn in Q1). And they don’t break down what is in this litigation expense. It could be taken from their legal reserves bucket or just be Sullivan & Cromwell’s legal bill. We never really know what is being credited and debited.

Robert Christensen of Natoma Partners has been warning his clients about this for over a year now in his very insightful quarterly newsletter.
He told me in an interview today, “It’s been increasingly clear in the last few days that JP Morgan has egregiously been under reserving.” Christensen goes on to point out that their is NO information publicly available in which you can count the current litigation reserves they hold on the balance sheet. That’s because he says the bank reports what is going into the legal reserves but not what is coming out. And the estimates we see in footnotes is not what hits the income statement or capital levels.

“We are seeing very big numbers coming out of the press on what JPM will likely pay the Government for rmbs suits but that’s just the government. What about the $100 billion plus of private rmbs suits that expect a settlement also?” warns Christensen.

And on top of all that the OCC, their bank regulator, and the SEC, their securities regulator, have been allowing JP Morgan to under reserved for RMBS lawsuits and putbacks for years now. It’s like the regulator is now part of the scheme to defraud JP Morgan shareholders.

Christensen wrote in his June newsletter:

Litigation expense recorded in Q1 2013 was $0.3 billion. There was no disclosure of how much of this amount was for litigation reserves or
how much was mortgage related… all such current and future claims are not included in the mortgage repurchase liability, but rather in litigation reserves. However, those amounts have not specifically been broken out and the total legal reserve for private label loan sales has never been disclosed.

Which basically means America’s largest bank thinks a main street shareholder doesn’t deserve to know what it’s doing to payback the clients it’s accused of defrauding.