by Teri Buhl
Sweden’s largest publicly traded real estate company’s stock traded up today (22%) with a view that it has beaten a group of sophisticated dissenting hedge fund creditors at their own game—at least in the short term.
Samhällsbyggnadsbolaget i Norden AB (known as SBB) orchestrated its own debt exchange without engaging with any creditor groups that formed over the last two years, according to bondholders and advisors involved in the situation. Today the company announced that 95% of its creditors qualified to participate in the debt exchange agreed to its terms resulting in the exchange of €2.8 billion ($2.94 billion) of debt. Creditors I spoke to on Tuesday had told me they expected a large percentage of bondholders to take the deal, while equity holders were watching to see if SBB could get over a 90% participation rate. SBB ended up beating the expectations of nearly everyone I spoke with, but there are still some important unknowns when looking at the company’s liquidity risk.
Around SEK 1.6bn of SBB’s longer-dated bonds featuring the original terms still exist, according to Danske Bank credit analyst Louis Landeman. Landeman thinks there are around SEK 5bn of bonds maturing in 2025 issued with the same terms –including the interest coverage ratio covenant the company is being sued over. Fir Tree alleges a breach of this covenant and has filed a lawsuit before the English courts, which is due to be heard in January. If Fir Tree wins its lawsuit, creditors in about SEK 6.6bn of bonds could use the judgement to demand their bonds are paid off also. On the face of it this is a much lower payout than all the debt (about SEK 30bn) being able to accelerate. Which is why you are seeing headlines today in the Swedish press giving a rah rah that SBB has avoided a near term in-court bankruptcy.
But having reported on SBB for over two years, in my opinion, I have watched the company: restate financials without telling anyone, likely commit accounting manipulation to avoid a covenant breach, leave out material explanations in its publicly filed financials that leads to possible inflated asset values, and allowing its ousted CEO to still direct financial decisions makes me think there is more risk under the surface.
SBB had been touting a view all year that its liquidity position would improve with support of the recent IPO of Sveafastigheter and some other asset sales. But that hasn’t really happened. At the end of September I was told a story about the CEO of SBB, Leiv Synnes, hosting a dinner with SBB’s founder and board member Ilija Batljan, people on the Castlelake asset buying team, advisors on what is now called ‘the Svea IPO’ and some of SBB’s bankers. The gathering was somewhat of a celebration that this crew was about to pull off a new spin-off IPO on its residential assets that some market participants viewed as having inflated net asset values. The dinner was centered around what is called in Sweden a “fermented fish party” (a traditional northern Swedish dish – the smell is terrible). According to a person familiar with the dinner there was drinking and the group talked about the Svea IPO expectations of being at least a 30% discount to NAV, which anyone familiar with SBB’s financials would know is not enough to cover SBB’s January 2025 maturities.
It’s this kind of clubby, nearly incestuous, relationship between Swedish companies and their bankers, advisors, and local asset managers that makes it hard for investors outside of Sweden to make financial estimates and assumptions. I recall one of my former 9fin analyst in shock when they saw how SBB kept buying back its hybrid bonds instead of preserving cash for its more senior secured bonds held by the likes of Elliot and other large distressed UK debt funds.
Richard Brase, a former Dagens Industri opinion/analyst writer was really the only one in the Swedish press who knew enough, and had the balls, to try and hold the SBB executives accountable to the financials they spit out to their less sophisticated stock investors. In one of Brase’s last stories at DI he literally tanked the stock by double digits by explaining why stockholders should “Sell Now–before it’s too late”. Brase pointed out, on November 2nd, that SBB’s latest year-end report said the company expected to generate SEK2.5bn in cash flow in 2024; but half way through the year SBB had a negative SEK 13mn cash flow. He also explained the unrealistic loan to values SBB held on its books and why it could blow up bond covenants by writing them down to realistic market values, which was also highlighted by Viceroy Research in 2022.
All of the above is a long winded way of explaining why investors still need to watch out for what is called a cross default. This is when one credit security – like SBB’s 2028 euro bonds – goes into acceleration because the company broke one of its covenants, which could then lead Nordic bankers holding SBB’s smaller term loans to call them in because there is a ‘rule’ in the banker’s deal that, if they are forced to pay off another creditor’s debt, first SBB has to pay off the bank loan debt.
First off, SBB’s debt exchange has now moved a ton of decent assets out of Holdco into a new llc and the new bonds don’t have the same maintenance covenant. This makes it much easier for SBB to not worry about the whole interest coverage ratio issue that allows bondholders to force an early payoff in these new bonds. But in speaking with lawyers and bondholders familiar with SBB’s debt, there is a concern about how SBB’s bank debt is tied to SBB’s operating company. Should there be a cross default or covenant breach, it could give SBB’s bankers reason to call in their loans. Every analyst I spoke with doesn’t have enough information to form a view on how bad the current blackhole could be.
Just look at what came out in SBB’s internal email obtained by Fir Tree’s lawyers, Cleary Gottlieb. Last month we learned according to court documents that SBB’s IR person, Helena, got a call from SEB, warning her that their client (I believe its First Commercial) thinks you breached the maintenance covenant on what I think is called a floating rate schuldschein loan, also known as a Schuldscheindarlehen (SSD). Then we see from internal SBB emails disclosed in court that Leiv is allegedly called in to come up with a fix because SBB has realized ‘OH SHIT’ this could also breach billions in bonds. And then concerns of a real life cross-default begins to fester at the senior levels of management.
Now the changes to covenants in the new bonds can also take away other cross default concerns, such as what is called a EoD (event of default). This is designed so that if SBB bonds that Fir Tree and friends hold blow up it won’t affect the new bonds that just had exchanged with creditors today. Here is what CreditSights said on the EoD last week. “We believe that this change implies that if there is a default at the legacy issuers then the New Securities may not also face a cross default. We suspect this could mean, if Fir Tree was to win the trial for example, this would contain a potential restructuring to the Holdco levels above The New Issuer. We also wonder if this could influence SBB’s ability today, or be a stepping stone for its structure in the future, that allows it to raise or refinance bank debt, as it creates greater separation between the group’s assets and the legacy bonds.”
Net net the two men actually running SBB have just used market sentiment and the credit trading system to beat naysayers at their own game, in the short term. And while some creditors and equity short sellers would yell “Not Fair” it’s all pretty much legal in the sophisticated world of distressed investing.
SBB did not respond for comment.
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